Марино И. Отрешение Президента Российской Федерации от должности: разработки, концепции, позиции участников Конституционного совещания 1993 г.

Аннотация: The Constitutional Conference transcript gives us a possibility to capture the actual authors of the provisions on the impeachment institution in Russia, disputes with regard to its establishment, alternative approaches by various authors of the Constitution and even, not least importantly, the environment, the “political climate” within which the draft Constitution of the country, including the article on renunciation of the Presidency, was being developed. The article is focused only on passive responsibility of the President of the Russian Federation, more precisely, on developing the Constitutional provision on renunciation of the Russian Federation Presidency within the framework of the Constitutional Conference. The Constitutional Conference transcript demonstrates the multiple attempts by S.A. Filatov, an author of the Constitution close to the first Russian President B.N. Yeltsin, not to establish such mechanism in Russia at all. S.A. Filatov’s position is clear-cut: “We should not be too keen on impeachment.” The pragmatic “Kotenkov’s concept” aimed at protection from future legislators prevailed at the Constitutional Conference. The concept provides for the procedure of renunciation of the Presidency in the Constitution, however, the procedure itself is extremely complicated and stipulated in much detail. Its pragmatic purpose is to avoid possible surprises on the part of yet unelected and, therefore, unclearly disposed towards the President legislators after the Constitution adoption. Eventually, A.A. Kotenkov and his “constitutional adherents” got the expected result: the option more convenient for the President – to provide for the impeachment institution at the same time stipulating it in the maximum possible detail “at home,” i.e. at the President’s Constitutional Conference, there and then, in order to keep the situation “under control.” It is common knowledge that the procedure of renunciation of the Russian Federation Presidency established by the Presidential Constitutional Conference in 1993 is extremely complicated. In our opinion, this article gives us a real classical example in the Constitution when the responsibility of the President is formally stipulated and implementable, however, both the article itself and the Constitution in general contain multiple effectively functioning mechanisms rendering the practical implementation of the supreme sanction with regard to the first person of the country difficult to the maximum extent. Minor likelihood of renunciation of the Presidency is not only due to a particularly complicated procedure described above. A number of other factors should also be mentioned. First of all, it should be reminded that half of the Federation Council chamber members are representatives of executive authorities of constituent territories of the Federation which, in their turn, are formed with direct participation of the President of the Russian Federation. It should also be noted that the President of the Russian Federation takes part in formation of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts and, as everyone knows, it is him and only him who nominates judges for approval by the Federation Council. So, specifically in order to understand the basic reasons for such an article in the Constitution, for such a result, we regarded it a priority to try recreating a really unbiased picture of the way the Constitution authors in 1993 wished to settle the impeachment institution. Each article of the 1993 Constitution has a separate story, its own background, its own “constitutional heroes.” Kotenkov’s, Mityukov’s Yakovlev’s, Filatov’s supporters and others have become the history of the Russian constitutional reforms of the 1990s and we need to asses them as the authors of the constitutional provisions in an impartial and unbiased manner. It’s time to find out “who is who?” in the Russian constitutional process. In our opinion, an attentive analysis of the Constitutional Conference transcript and of the not less important transcript of the Constitution Committee giving a significant impetus to the whole constitutional process in 1990s is the priority direction both for comprehensive research in the story of the Russian constitutional processes of the 1990s and at the same time for a more adequate study and understanding of the contents of the Russian Supreme Law. Proper study of the debates, of all the disputes around each provision of the Constitution at the time when such provisions were actually being developed allows more adequate and precise interpretation of each constitutional provision.

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Abstract: The Constitutional Conference transcript gives us a possibility to capture the actual authors of the provisions on the impeachment institution in Russia, disputes with regard to its establishment, alternative approaches by various authors of the Constitution and even, not least importantly, the environment, the “political climate” within which the draft Constitution of the country, including the article on renunciation of the Presidency, was being developed. The article is focused only on passive responsibility of the President of the Russian Federation, more precisely, on developing the Constitutional provision on renunciation of the Russian Federation Presidency within the framework of the Constitutional Conference. The Constitutional Conference transcript demonstrates the multiple attempts by S.A. Filatov, an author of the Constitution close to the first Russian President B.N. Yeltsin, not to establish such mechanism in Russia at all. S.A. Filatov’s position is clear-cut: “We should not be too keen on impeachment.” The pragmatic “Kotenkov’s concept” aimed at protection from future legislators prevailed at the Constitutional Conference. The concept provides for the procedure of renunciation of the Presidency in the Constitution, however, the procedure itself is extremely complicated and stipulated in much detail. Its pragmatic purpose is to avoid possible surprises on the part of yet unelected and, therefore, unclearly disposed towards the President legislators after the Constitution adoption. Eventually, A.A. Kotenkov and his “constitutional adherents” got the expected result: the option more convenient for the President – to provide for the impeachment institution at the same time stipulating it in the maximum possible detail “at home,” i.e. at the President’s Constitutional Conference, there and then, in order to keep the situation “under control.” It is common knowledge that the procedure of renunciation of the Russian Federation Presidency established by the Presidential Constitutional Conference in 1993 is extremely complicated. In our opinion, this article gives us a real classical example in the Constitution when the responsibility of the President is formally stipulated and implementable, however, both the article itself and the Constitution in general contain multiple effectively functioning mechanisms rendering the practical implementation of the supreme sanction with regard to the first person of the country difficult to the maximum extent. Minor likelihood of renunciation of the Presidency is not only due to a particularly complicated procedure described above. A number of other factors should also be mentioned. First of all, it should be reminded that half of the Federation Council chamber members are representatives of executive authorities of constituent territories of the Federation which, in their turn, are formed with direct participation of the President of the Russian Federation. It should also be noted that the President of the Russian Federation takes part in formation of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts and, as everyone knows, it is him and only him who nominates judges for approval by the Federation Council. So, specifically in order to understand the basic reasons for such an article in the Constitution, for such a result, we regarded it a priority to try recreating a really unbiased picture of the way the Constitution authors in 1993 wished to settle the impeachment institution. Each article of the 1993 Constitution has a separate story, its own background, its own “constitutional heroes.” Kotenkov’s, Mityukov’s Yakovlev’s, Filatov’s supporters and others have become the history of the Russian constitutional reforms of the 1990s and we need to asses them as the authors of the constitutional provisions in an impartial and unbiased manner. It’s time to find out “who is who?” in the Russian constitutional process. In our opinion, an attentive analysis of the Constitutional Conference transcript and of the not less important transcript of the Constitution Committee giving a significant impetus to the whole constitutional process in 1990s is the priority direction both for comprehensive research in the story of the Russian constitutional processes of the 1990s and at the same time for a more adequate study and understanding of the contents of the Russian Supreme Law. Proper study of the debates, of all the disputes around each provision of the Constitution at the time when such provisions were actually being developed allows more adequate and precise interpretation of each constitutional provision.

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