Архив
Правильная ссылка на статью:
Марино И.
Отрешение Президента Российской Федерации от должности: разработки, концепции, позиции участников Конституционного совещания 1993 г.
// LEX RUSSICA (РУССКИЙ ЗАКОН).
2010. № 4.
С. 750-766.
URL: https://nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=59670
Аннотация:
The Constitutional Conference transcript gives us a possibility to capture
the actual authors of the provisions on the impeachment institution in Russia,
disputes with regard to its establishment, alternative approaches by various authors
of the Constitution and even, not least importantly, the environment, the
“political climate” within which the draft Constitution of the country, including
the article on renunciation of the Presidency, was being developed.
The article is focused only on passive responsibility of the President of
the Russian Federation, more precisely, on developing the Constitutional provision
on renunciation of the Russian Federation Presidency within the framework
of the Constitutional Conference.
The Constitutional Conference transcript demonstrates the multiple attempts
by S.A. Filatov, an author of the Constitution close to the first Russian
President B.N. Yeltsin, not to establish such mechanism in Russia at all.
S.A. Filatov’s position is clear-cut: “We should not be too keen on impeachment.”
The pragmatic “Kotenkov’s concept” aimed at protection from future
legislators prevailed at the Constitutional Conference. The concept provides for
the procedure of renunciation of the Presidency in the Constitution, however, the
procedure itself is extremely complicated and stipulated in much detail. Its
pragmatic purpose is to avoid possible surprises on the part of yet unelected and,
therefore, unclearly disposed towards the President legislators after the Constitution
adoption.
Eventually, A.A. Kotenkov and his “constitutional adherents” got the
expected result: the option more convenient for the President – to provide for the
impeachment institution at the same time stipulating it in the maximum possible
detail “at home,” i.e. at the President’s Constitutional Conference, there and
then, in order to keep the situation “under control.”
It is common knowledge that the procedure of renunciation of the Russian
Federation Presidency established by the Presidential Constitutional Conference
in 1993 is extremely complicated.
In our opinion, this article gives us a real classical example in the Constitution
when the responsibility of the President is formally stipulated and implementable,
however, both the article itself and the Constitution in general contain
multiple effectively functioning mechanisms rendering the practical implementation
of the supreme sanction with regard to the first person of the country
difficult to the maximum extent.
Minor likelihood of renunciation of the Presidency is not only due to a
particularly complicated procedure described above. A number of other factors
should also be mentioned. First of all, it should be reminded that half of the Federation
Council chamber members are representatives of executive authorities of constituent territories of the Federation which, in their turn, are formed with direct
participation of the President of the Russian Federation.
It should also be noted that the President of the Russian Federation takes
part in formation of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts and, as everyone
knows, it is him and only him who nominates judges for approval by the Federation
Council.
So, specifically in order to understand the basic reasons for such an article
in the Constitution, for such a result, we regarded it a priority to try recreating
a really unbiased picture of the way the Constitution authors in 1993 wished
to settle the impeachment institution.
Each article of the 1993 Constitution has a separate story, its own background,
its own “constitutional heroes.”
Kotenkov’s, Mityukov’s Yakovlev’s, Filatov’s supporters and others
have become the history of the Russian constitutional reforms of the 1990s and
we need to asses them as the authors of the constitutional provisions in an impartial
and unbiased manner.
It’s time to find out “who is who?” in the Russian constitutional process.
In our opinion, an attentive analysis of the Constitutional Conference
transcript and of the not less important transcript of the Constitution Committee
giving a significant impetus to the whole constitutional process in 1990s is the
priority direction both for comprehensive research in the story of the Russian
constitutional processes of the 1990s and at the same time for a more adequate
study and understanding of the contents of the Russian Supreme Law.
Proper study of the debates, of all the disputes around each provision of
the Constitution at the time when such provisions were actually being developed
allows more adequate and precise interpretation of each constitutional provision.
Ключевые слова:
Президент РФ, Конституционное совещание, импичмент, конституционная ответственность
Abstract:
The Constitutional Conference transcript gives us a possibility to capture
the actual authors of the provisions on the impeachment institution in Russia,
disputes with regard to its establishment, alternative approaches by various authors
of the Constitution and even, not least importantly, the environment, the
“political climate” within which the draft Constitution of the country, including
the article on renunciation of the Presidency, was being developed.
The article is focused only on passive responsibility of the President of
the Russian Federation, more precisely, on developing the Constitutional provision
on renunciation of the Russian Federation Presidency within the framework
of the Constitutional Conference.
The Constitutional Conference transcript demonstrates the multiple attempts
by S.A. Filatov, an author of the Constitution close to the first Russian
President B.N. Yeltsin, not to establish such mechanism in Russia at all.
S.A. Filatov’s position is clear-cut: “We should not be too keen on impeachment.”
The pragmatic “Kotenkov’s concept” aimed at protection from future
legislators prevailed at the Constitutional Conference. The concept provides for
the procedure of renunciation of the Presidency in the Constitution, however, the
procedure itself is extremely complicated and stipulated in much detail. Its
pragmatic purpose is to avoid possible surprises on the part of yet unelected and,
therefore, unclearly disposed towards the President legislators after the Constitution
adoption.
Eventually, A.A. Kotenkov and his “constitutional adherents” got the
expected result: the option more convenient for the President – to provide for the
impeachment institution at the same time stipulating it in the maximum possible
detail “at home,” i.e. at the President’s Constitutional Conference, there and
then, in order to keep the situation “under control.”
It is common knowledge that the procedure of renunciation of the Russian
Federation Presidency established by the Presidential Constitutional Conference
in 1993 is extremely complicated.
In our opinion, this article gives us a real classical example in the Constitution
when the responsibility of the President is formally stipulated and implementable,
however, both the article itself and the Constitution in general contain
multiple effectively functioning mechanisms rendering the practical implementation
of the supreme sanction with regard to the first person of the country
difficult to the maximum extent.
Minor likelihood of renunciation of the Presidency is not only due to a
particularly complicated procedure described above. A number of other factors
should also be mentioned. First of all, it should be reminded that half of the Federation
Council chamber members are representatives of executive authorities of constituent territories of the Federation which, in their turn, are formed with direct
participation of the President of the Russian Federation.
It should also be noted that the President of the Russian Federation takes
part in formation of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts and, as everyone
knows, it is him and only him who nominates judges for approval by the Federation
Council.
So, specifically in order to understand the basic reasons for such an article
in the Constitution, for such a result, we regarded it a priority to try recreating
a really unbiased picture of the way the Constitution authors in 1993 wished
to settle the impeachment institution.
Each article of the 1993 Constitution has a separate story, its own background,
its own “constitutional heroes.”
Kotenkov’s, Mityukov’s Yakovlev’s, Filatov’s supporters and others
have become the history of the Russian constitutional reforms of the 1990s and
we need to asses them as the authors of the constitutional provisions in an impartial
and unbiased manner.
It’s time to find out “who is who?” in the Russian constitutional process.
In our opinion, an attentive analysis of the Constitutional Conference
transcript and of the not less important transcript of the Constitution Committee
giving a significant impetus to the whole constitutional process in 1990s is the
priority direction both for comprehensive research in the story of the Russian
constitutional processes of the 1990s and at the same time for a more adequate
study and understanding of the contents of the Russian Supreme Law.
Proper study of the debates, of all the disputes around each provision of
the Constitution at the time when such provisions were actually being developed
allows more adequate and precise interpretation of each constitutional provision.
Keywords:
Prezident RF, Konstitutsionnoe soveshchanie, impichment