Geopolitics of the Black Sea after the Cold War: State and Prospects / Геополитика Черного моря после холодной войны: состояние и перспективы

Татлыоглу Эрман кандидат исторических наук аспирант, кафедра Теории и истории международных отношений, Российский университет дружбы народов 101000, Россия, г. Москва, бул. Чистопрудный, 14с3, кв. 70 Tatlioglu Erman PhD in History Postgraduate, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 101000, Russia, Moscow, blvd. Chistoprudny, 14c3, sq. 70 ermantatlioglu@gmail.com Другие публикации этого автора

Introduction

Historically, the Black Sea region has been the center of the intersection of interests and contradictions of many actors in international relations. For a long time, the main actors were the Russian state and the Ottoman Empire. Between them there was a division of the territory of the Black Sea, the question of the status of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was acute. For example, the problem of the straits was central both during the military conflicts between the two powers in the 19th century and during the First World War. And in the future, already when discussing the results of the Second World War, the Soviet Union advocated granting it special rights to use the straits, including the possibility of creating its own military bases in the immediate vicinity.

At the same time, not only the Russian state and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) influenced the geopolitics of the region. As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, many new actors appeared in the region, primarily Romania and Bulgaria. The instability of the borders was clearly demonstrated in the two Balkan wars of the early 20th century. We can talk about a kind of stabilization in the region in relation to the period 1945-1991. within the framework of the Yalta-Potsdam system and the bipolar world. However, after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and the socialist bloc, many more actors appeared in the region: in addition to Turkey and Russia, Bulgaria and Romania, Ukraine and Georgia became formally independent actors. Accordingly, the range of interests expanded, and the influence of other Western states on the situation in the region increased. All this makes the analysis of the geopolitical position of the Black Sea relevant and in demand.

1. Geopolitical situation in the Black Sea after the end of the Cold War: general characteristics

The Black Sea has historically been the center of the intersection of civilizations and rather dissimilar value systems. Traditionally, this is the center of the intersection of Orthodoxy and Islam, but now the influence of Western civilization is added to this.

In addition to the geographical location of the region, its economic significance should be noted. It is not only a transit route linking Europe and Asia, but also a potential source of hydrocarbons. The same Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are already working on the Black Sea shelf. Among the difficulties: the assessment of potential reserves and technological difficulties with production due to the average sea depth of about 2000 km ^{[8, p. 120]}.

Exclusively from a geopolitical point of view, the Black Sea is a fairly remote and closed area. In fact, it has always been located on the border of the central European trade routes and the development of European civilization. And yet, he received considerable attention from the European powers, especially the trading ones. At the same time, the region is located in close proximity to the Middle East, the richest oil region in the world. After realizing the threat of world terrorism, the region can be considered as a relatively safe and important base for pre-empting and combating radical groups that often form in the Middle East ^{[9, p. 46]}.

In the 1990s the collapse of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum in the region. Various forces sought to fill it. It is problematic to talk about the serious influence of Moscow on the region in the 1990s, for example, in connection with the formation of GUAM and the attempt of regional actors to strengthen themselves in the region on their own. On the other hand, both GUAM and BSEC experienced strong American influence.

But already in the 21st century, most of the Black Sea powers showed their inability to pursue an independent foreign policy. All of them came under the influence of stronger international actors represented by the US and the EU, to a lesser extent by Russia and Turkey. This balance of power as a whole is also indicated in the work of A.A. Irkhin, who distinguishes three groups of actors operating in the Black Sea region:

- World powers including the USA, EU and Russia.

- Regional powers, first of all, represented by Turkey.

- Weaker regional actors ^{[11, p. 501]}.

If in the 1990’s one can speak of a period of uncertainty - both the search for independent ways of development and attempts to choose which of the global centers of power to rely on - then in the 2000s the situation changes quite dramatically. Bulgaria and Romania are members of both NATO and the EU. Georgia's course is also changing to a pro-American one. The situation in Ukraine is destabilizing, alternately pro-Russian and pro-Western forces come to power ^{[9, p. 44]}. It is possible to talk about the final approval of the pro-Western course in all countries of the region (with the exception of Russia and Ukraine) in relation to 2007-2008.

Characteristic processes of changing the geopolitical structure of the region after the Cold War: the change of Russian and former Soviet influence to American and European ones, as well as the formation of a unified energy infrastructure connecting European countries with gas and oil fields in the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia ^{[8, p. 120]}.

An interesting idea is expressed in the work of V. Dergachev. He notes that the entry of Novorossia into the Russian Empire was a successful example of integration in the European space. It was within Russia and the Soviet Union that the region became one of the dynamically developing regions. After the end of the Cold War, it was again thrown back "to the northern periphery of the Mediterranean space"^{[10, p. 163]} and few people are interested in the development of its regional actors.

As noted in the work of A.A. Irkhin, after the Cold War, the following stages of the formation of the geopolitical situation in the region can be distinguished:

- From 1992 to 1996 attempts were made to implement major regional integration processes, primarily the BSEC. In the same period, there is a gradual distancing of the former republics of the USSR from Russia.

- From 1997 to 2001 are associated with increased US and EU attention to the region.

- From 2001 to 2008 is largely associated with the strengthening of US foreign operations: in Afghanistan, Iraq, as well as with the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. At the same time, Romania and Bulgaria join the EU and NATO, and Russia seeks to strengthen its influence in the region through economic instruments (pipelines).

- From 2008 to 2014 Changes in the region are connected both with the events in Georgia in August 2008 and with the continued strengthening of the EU in the region, especially within the framework of the organization's regional integration initiatives.

- From 2014 to 2021 there is a period of even sharper competition in the region between world centers and forces represented by Russia, the EU and the USA. The aggravation of tension was associated with the annexation of Crimea to Russia ^{[11, p. 510]}.

- From 2022 to the present, there seems to be a new stage associated with Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. It is largely related to the previous one, but it is distinguished by even more active involvement of the EU and the US in the situation in the region. For example, in the form of financial and technical support for Ukraine.

In general, throughout the entire period under review, one can speak of attempts to freeze regional conflicts and maintain the poorly formed status quo in the 1990s and the gradual escalation of frozen conflicts into hot ones throughout the 21st century. Vivid evidence of this: the conflicts in Georgia in August 2008, the conflicts in Ukraine since 2014, the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, the SMO of Russia in Ukraine since 2022.

2. Interests of leading actors in the Black Sea region

US and EU. The foreign policy goal of the United States is quite clearly reflected in the strategy of the Heritage Foundation of 2006. It is closely connected with the expulsion of Russia from the region "due to the promotion of the Euro-Atlantic community"^{[11, p. 502]}. In addition, it is planned to involve in this community not only the Black Sea countries, but also the nearest ones, for example, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The latter, in accordance with American ideas, are included in the Greater Black Sea region.

Achieving this goal involves solving the following tasks:

- Ensuring diversification of oil and gas supplies for a number of countries bypassing Russia.

- Creation of a military-strategic foothold.

- Maintaining geopolitical pluralism in the region.

- Creation of a “barrier” from Russia in the form of a number of countries from the Baltic states through Ukraine and the countries of the Caucasus up to the countries of Central Asia ^{[11, p 503]}.

For the EU, first of all, stable access to the energy resources of the Caspian Sea is important. Within the framework of the Black Sea Synergy initiative of regional cooperation in 2007, the EU sought to ensure energy security in the region, regulate issues of infrastructure development, maritime policy and fisheries, and the environment ^{[11, p. 504]}. On the other hand, in the framework of the 2008 initiative "Eastern Partnership" it was already about the potential provision of associations to the countries of the region, i.e. closer integration with the EU without taking into account the opinion of Russia. It seems that the events of August 2008 in Georgia had an effect on this turn. And yet, this is one of the reasons for the subsequent conflicts in the region, as, for example, is indicated in the work of V.G. Koguta ^{[13, p. 171]}.

In a number of internal documents, the EU (after the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the union) emphasized that the Black Sea basin is one of the strategic regions of the world, which is of key importance for the EU and its members ^[5]. In connection with the start of the SMO, the EU expressed its concern (in addition to sanctions pressure and assistance to Ukraine), noted that any provocations on the border of any member state or attacks on ships in the Black Sea basin could lead to a further escalation of the conflict ^[4].

Russia. For Russia, the Black Sea is one of the few natural defensive lines in the western direction. Otherwise, the western border up to St. Petersburg falls on the East European Plain: a flat area practically devoid of natural defensive lines.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia was under the threat of losing the largest naval base in the region- Sevastopol. As a result, the situation was resolved: an agreement was concluded on the long-term lease of a number of bays in Sevastopol to accommodate the Russian navy. At first, the lease was calculated for 20 years (1997 contract), and then it was extended for another 25 years (2010 contract), i.е. up to 2042. At the same time, in addition to the basing of the navy, the limits of the presence of other military equipment and the military contingent of Russia on the territory of Ukraine were stipulated. For example, the number of military personnel is up to 25 thousand people ^[3].

The accession of Crimea is largely due to the need for Russia to maintain its positions in the Black Sea region. If in the 1990s and 2000s Russia sought to maintain the status quo in the region, after the events in Ukraine in 2014 the risk of cancellation of previously reached agreements increased. For Russia, promising areas in the region:

- Military-political strengthening in order to prevent the strengthening of non-Black Sea powers in the region.

- Strengthening integration processes under the auspices of Moscow.

- Development of energy projects ^{[11, p. 509]}.

In addition, it seems that the question of the status of the Bosporus and Dardanelles is still relevant for Russia.

As for the problem of the straits, it is de jure resolved under the Montreux Convention on the Status of the Straits of 1936. In accordance with it, sovereignty over the Bosporus and Dardanelles belongs to Turkey, but this state has committed itself to the norms of international maritime law, in particular, to ensure free passage to all merchant ships in peacetime.

The convention also provides for the passage of military vessels. At the same time, a number of restrictions are imposed on the Black Sea powers in favor of Turkey and, it seems, other non-Black Sea powers. Thus, the powers are obliged to inform Turkey in the event of the passage of submarines through the straits, to notify Turkey of the passage of military ships: 8 days in advance for the Black Sea powers, 15 days in advance for non-Black Sea powers. Turkey has the right to close the straits in the event of a direct threat to its own independence, which generally follows from the country's sovereignty over the straits. It is important to note that in accordance with Article 18 for non-Black Sea powers, the maximum tonnage of the fleet in the Black Sea is limited to 30,000 tons, but with significant reservations, the right to increase to 45,000 tons ^[1].

According to I.I. Rogov, the Montreux Convention and its provisions are largely outdated. And the practice of the last 30 years shows the desire of Russia and Turkey to agree on the regime of the straits at the bilateral level, and not be limited only by the norms of this convention. A striking example is the new regulation on navigation through the Straits of 1998, in particular, which abolished the permitting procedure for the passage of large-capacity tankers ^{[15, p. 214]}.

Turkey. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 was met in Turkey with the hope of strengthening its own state, due to the new Islamic states formed in the post-Soviet space, the weakening of Moscow's position in the Black Sea region. As Turkish President T. Ozal stated: "the century of the Turks is coming"^{[14, p. 95]}. Hopes for the creation of the "Great Turan" were revived again.

In the 2000s, such a policy began to meet resistance from Moscow, which only pushed Turkey to further rapprochement of its foreign policy with the course of the EU and the United States. However, after the coup attempt in 2016, the situation changed. Ties with the United States were not severed, but the country's foreign policy became less unambiguous. It still pursues national interests, while in order to achieve them, Ankara often goes for rapprochement with Moscow.

In addition, the development of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism has led to the fact that the idea of rapprochement with the EU has ceased to be the main one for the country. Turkey seeks to reach the global level, while positioning itself as the protector of the Muslim World ^{[11, p. 505]}.

What significantly distinguishes Turkey from weaker regional actors: involvement in the energy infrastructure (the same TANAP gas pipelines and the Turkish Stream) along with a strong navy and army. Turkey over the past decades has shown a willingness to use its armed forces, regardless of the opinions of other countries. So it was in Cyprus in 1974, in Libya in 2019, in Syria over the past years. As well as the ability to cooperate both with Western centers of power and with Eastern ones.

Romania and Bulgaria. Romania is significantly inferior to the actors mentioned above, but is striving for the role of a strong regional power in Southeast Europe. Formally, Romania associates its statehood with the Roman Empire, and therefore feels like a part of the Western world. There are projects to create a "Greater Romania", primarily through unification with Moldova. And yet the country's position does not seem sufficiently stable for such ambitions. For example, there are many problems with neighboring Hungary. In Romania itself, about 1.5 million Hungarians live in isolated regions of Transylvania, who claim greater autonomy. In 2011, their claims were partly supported by Budapest: they received not only the right to Hungarian citizenship, but also the right to participate in national elections in Hungary ^{[10, p. 162]}.

Romania joined NATO quite late compared to a number of other Eastern European countries. For example, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the Alliance in 1997. Until 2003, analysts noted double pressure on Romania: both from the West and from Russia- in connection with which they did not exclude the possibility of strengthening pro-Russian sentiments in the country.

Despite the late entry into NATO, Romania was one of the first countries in Eastern Europe to sign a framework agreement with the United States on the deployment of American military bases on its territory ^{[8, p. 121]}. The official reason for the deployment of bases, called by President T. Basescu: to increase security in the region, especially in light of the frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Romania actively relies on NATO to strengthen its positions in the region. At the same time, the country does not seek to rely only on foreign fleets, but also puts forward a number of projects to strengthen its own fleet and other allied Black Sea powers. In particular, a proposal to strengthen, modernize and mutually coordinate the actions of the Black Sea flotillas of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey was made at the 2016 NATO summit by the President of the country K. Iohannis ^{[6, p. 11]}. In general, all this coincides with the goals of both Romania and the United States on the formation of a single "barrier" from Russia, at least from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

In general, Romania and Bulgaria adhere to a single European line towards Russia. It seems that relations are largely influenced by the period of the Cold War, which still retains the threat of subjugation from Russia for some of the political elites of these countries. Yet, despite independence, during the years of the Cold War, both foreign policy issues and a significant part of domestic policy issues in these countries were coordinated in Moscow. Therefore, statements similar to the statement of the Minister of Defense of Bulgaria K. Karakachanov are not uncommon: "Russian policy has never been fair in relation to Bulgaria and Bulgarian history" ^{[7, p. 11]}.

Apparently, despite joining both the EU and NATO, Bulgaria and Romania still feel like “borderland” countries. Those who have already experienced influence from the eastern frontiers. And the political elites of these countries are still afraid of the same thing, which worsens relations with Russia. It seems that if Turkey becomes stronger as an independent power and more independent from the West, the relations of these countries with it will worsen.

As for such countries as Ukraine and Georgia, their geopolitical influence is not seen as independent. Throughout the 21st century, countries have suffered territorial losses (in the form of Crimea, a number of eastern regions in Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia). This shows the insufficient strength of these actors in the international arena. In addition, territorial losses pushed Kyiv and Tbilisi away from Moscow into the hands of the Western powers, which made their policy even less independent. As correctly noted in the work of A.B. Shvets, at the moment, Russia has no allies in the Black Sea region, all countries- to one degree or another- are under the influence of Western centers of power ^{[16, p. 22]}.

3. Aggravation of contradictions in the region in the light of the annexation of Crimea and Russia's special military operation in Ukraine

In 2014, Crimea, which was part of Ukraine in 1991-2014, becomes part of the Russian Federation. This significantly changes the geopolitical situation in the region and aggravates relations between Russia and Ukraine, the US and the EU.

Shortly after the annexation of Crimea to Russia, NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg in 2016 called on the organization to build up its military presence in the Black Sea ^{[6, p. 10]}, which was eventually implemented. For example, in 2018, Alliance warships spent 40 more days in the region than in 2017, i.e. 120 days instead of 80 ^[17]. In Romania and Bulgaria, the deployment of NATO coordination structures and even the so-called. NATO multinational forces in the Craiova area.

In the Black Sea region itself, NATO military exercises have become more frequent: "Sea Breeze" (on a regular basis), "Cossack Mace" (held in 2021), "Mobile Spirit" (held in 2021), "Fast Trident" (on a on a regular basis), etc. There are not isolated examples of retaliatory actions by the Russian Navy in order to prevent the NATO fleet from crossing Russia's maritime borders ^{[13, p. 172]}.

The direct funding of the Ukrainian side has also increased, aimed at modernizing its armed forces. For example, the training center in Yavoriv alone “received $22 million worth of American equipment” ^{[6, p. 11]}.

In response to these actions, Russia has also increased its own military presence in the region, primarily by strengthening bases in Crimea. As a result, not only large naval forces were deployed on the territory of the peninsula, but also an army corps, air defense forces, and an air force division. At the same time, the forces of the Black Sea Fleet were increased in comparison with those that Russia had in the region until 2014 ^{[7, p. 11]}.

Even before the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, one can speak of growing tensions between the key actors in the region. Criticism and even militant rhetoric sounded from several sides at once. For example, in October 2021, US Secretary of Defense L. Austin visited a number of Black Sea states, designating the Black Sea as “one of the main fronts of confrontation with Russia” ^{[13, p. 172]}. All this was directly connected with the build-up and strengthening of the armed forces and their material and technical equipment in the Black Sea states.

The position of Turkey, the second most powerful Black Sea power after Russia, seems important. The accession of Crimea to Russia, on the one hand, was more favorable for Turkey than the appearance of American bases on the peninsula. On the other hand, it was necessary to respond to the strengthening of Russia in the region. A naval base was established in the city of Syurmen (Trabzon province). Along the diplomatic line, not only was the position of Ukraine supported, but the question of the rights of the Crimean Tatars was also raised ^{[11, p. 508]}.

As for the fact that Turkey does not recognize the inclusion of Crimea into Russia, it seems that one should not automatically conclude from this that Turkey is joining the united Western anti-Russian front. State sovereignty and inviolability of borders are universally recognized norms of international law, incl. within the framework of the current Yalta-Potsdam system, and the right of peoples to self-determination is not such a generally recognized norm. In this regard, almost any changes in borders associated with an independent decision of the population of certain regions (Kosovo, Abkhazia, Crimea, etc.) are not recognized by most states in the world.

Despite the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, after the events of 2016, Washington seems to be rapidly losing influence on it. Joint investment projects with Russia and the awareness of the need to preserve sovereignty and an independent foreign course are forcing Turkish politicians to take a more balanced attitude to the situation in the world, and not follow the course set in Washington or Brussels ^{[12, p. 219]}.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the geopolitical position of the Black Sea is due to the fact that the region is the center of the intersection of several civilizations and value systems, as well as a transit zone between Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia. During the Cold War, the situation in the region was stable, which was associated with the dominance of the USSR, but after its collapse, the situation changed.

Secondly, after the Cold War in the Black Sea region, there was a weakening of Russian positions, an increase in European and American influence. In the 21st century, almost all the Black Sea powers came under the influence of the US and/or the EU, and began to build their foreign policy in agreement with these powers. Almost the only exception (except Russia) can be considered Turkey, which, after the attempted coup in 2016, seeks to pursue a more independent foreign policy.

Thirdly, the active penetration of the Western powers into the region (primarily in the form of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO and the EU) caused a further aggravation of the situation in the region. The obvious task of the United States was the creation of a "buffer zone" between Russia and European countries, as well as strengthening its own control over the transit of hydrocarbons in the region, creating its own military-strategic foothold. For the EU, the main task was to strengthen the integration processes in the region under its own auspices. As a result, Moscow's attempts to return to its former frontiers, undertaken since the 2000s, were generally negatively perceived in Washington and Brussels. It is in this confrontation that one can see the reasons for the unfreezing of a number of regional conflicts.

Finally, with regard to the prospects for the geopolitical position of the Black Sea, it is problematic to talk about the stabilization of the situation in the region without a significant change in the positions of the parties. The most promising is the achievement of agreements between Russia and Turkey, for example, on the establishment of a new regime of the straits in the light of the fact that these two countries are the strongest regional powers. In the event that European and American influence on the region is reduced, the access of their military vessels to the Black Sea basin is limited, we can talk about the potential stabilization of the situation in the region without further attempts to redistribute spheres of influence.