

The metaphysics of man: images of being

Abstract. *The subject of study are human images that have taken shape in modern philosophy. The author proceeds from the assumption that the human image might be regarded in two dimensions: as «human» (human subjectivity) and as «superhuman» or meta-physical, manifested at various levels of his being, namely, semblance (possible being, being-as-seen) and seemingness (conditional being or being-as-if, pseudo-being as distinct from true being), the objectively essential (whatness) and the subjectively essential (whoness). The metaphysical image proper that fixes the relationship with the transcendental world – the true-essential, is differentiated into authenticity (self-being) and otherness (other-being). In his study, the author is guided by the methodology of existential phenomenology. From this viewpoint he offers his interpretation of the phenomena of human existence expressed by the notions «semblance» and «seemingness», «whatness» and «whoness», authenticity and otherness. The novelty of this work is in revealing a metaphysical dimension of human being that hides behind the layers of the properly «human» – human subjectivity, which is characterized by the tokens of thinking, freedom, creativity and reflexivity. At the latent level, the human image is expressed in terms of possible and conditional being. These, however, are but approaches to the main point. There is another essential level in the human being, which expresses his/her metaphysical essence – other-being.*

Keywords: *human being, subjectivity, thinking, freedom, creativity, reflexivity, semblance, seemingness, latent level, metaphysical image.*

In this article I proceed from the idea of the multiplicity of the worlds and the images of a human being. «The human in a human being» is a traditional subject of philosophical reflection. And I am hardly able to add something new to construction of his images. The best scientific and philosophical intellects of mankind have been pondering over this problem for decades. And many of them turn to searching the metaphysical foundations of human existence. That is why it would be interesting to pass to analysis of those foundations of human being that open the true-essential in him.

Certainly, the «human» should not be regarded as something self-evident and tangible, yielding to discovery by scientific instruments, and the «superhuman» – as incomprehensible, referring to the sphere of the «sciences of the soul» (philosophy, theology, etc.). For distinguishing between the real (empirical) and the metaphysical (transcendental) ways of human being, we should work out some criteria.

One might suppose that a distinctive feature of the human empirical world is substantivity (from Latin substantivus – self-sufficient, essential), i.e. a characteristic of the facts of man's self-sufficient and relatively independent existence as a living, real and not imagined being. The very existence of such a being might

remain a mystery for many generations of scientists and philosophers.

On the contrary, the «superhuman» in a human being is indicative of the presence of something greater in him than the fact of his empirical existence. This is what makes him a compound being related to the world by many invisible fibres. In general, I regard the «metaphysical image of man» as an *intuitively sensual and rational reflection of his superessence.*

In this sense, the superhuman is indicative of the presence of a projective element in human being. I understand projectivity as an extraposed way of constructing human realities as an imagined («possible») being, a source of the versatility of his worlds and mutual transitions between them.

The projective (and infinitely projected) essence of a human being is the «elusive» and imperceptible, implicit and dependent essence, which is most often set from outside or determined by a source unknown to him. Therefore, the result of such human projection of the reality of his own being cannot be predicted or calculated beforehand. It contains a lot of independent variables and factors. On the metaphysical level, we cannot make a judgement about human being in conventional scientific terms. It is always uncertain and

unpredictable for us, since we do not know its true causes. And only philosophy makes it possible for us to approach apprehension of the whole complexity of human being.

Certainly, the «superhuman» exists in the human nature but to discover the fact of its existence a special approach (method) is required. I would call it the method of a step-by-step reconstruction of the metaphysical foundations of the human image.

According to this method, immersion into the human metaphysical world, in which the «superhuman» is expressed, occurs in successive steps – from the «external», observable layers to the «internal», essential levels of human reality.

In the course of analysis, I found various facets of human subjectivity and the related levels of comprehension of the human world as a multi-layer reality:

- 1) ways of human presentation found on the externally observable levels of his being: behavioural organism, figure («semblance») and person («seemingness»);
- 2) ways of human existence on the latent levels of being: itness («whatness») and self («whoness»);
- 3) ways of possible and transcendent human experience: existentiality (authenticity) and transpersonality (otherness).

It is comprehension of the latter layers of human being allows me to come closer to a construction of a metaphysical image that is hiding deep beyond the visible part of the human world.

Externally observable levels of human being

A movement to elucidation of the metaphysical foundations of human being should begin with elucidation of the visible, sensually tangible part of reality which refers to the empirical world.

The visible level of human reality. On the one hand, we can observe our physical body, notice its specificities that distinguish us from other individuals of our species. On the other hand, there are the subject and symbolic sides of human reality: clothes, language, gestures, mimic, outer ways of behaviour, that is, what is called a behavioural style. All these characteristics refer to our behavioural organism and external subjectness (figure), which are manifested in verbal or nonverbal, instrumental or communicative behaviour.

Seemance, however, is not always what really is. It is only the «tip of an iceberg». Our idea of ourselves as human beings might be distorted, falling into dependence from subjective likings, moods, rumours, etc. So, the following research principle is more applicable here: «most often we see in an individual what we want or can see». Hence the visible part of the image is but a subjective pic-

ture of the reality of a particular individual, not having direct relation to his essence.

By way of self-reflection we eventually do not come to know what is hidden beyond the visible layer of our empirical reality but can only suppose, make assumptions about this. We can judge, for example, about external manners and habits, traits and characteristics of ourselves or another individual, proceeding from our own cognitive and sensual experience. And it is even more difficult to come to know through reflection his value preferences and worldview attitudes. Therefore, each time a metaphysical essence of an individual appears before us and immediately disappears. In the course of reflection we can only establish that this individual is not a phantom and ascribe to him a certain set of characteristics or specific features of behaviour.

Hence, there is a certain distance between human reality as actual being, being-as-is or being-now-and-then and the observed being, being-as-seen. I can come to know the visible part of human being directly through my sense organs. And actual being opens to me through reflection, which filters and clears from seemingness my observations and impressions. So, that which we can see or which seems to us is far from always such in reality. At this level of reflexive analysis I am still far from comprehension of the metaphysical human image. But some details can be fixed that might further help us to construct a fuller picture of the human world.

So, already at the visible level of human being we can find some similarities and differences between particular individuals. We distinguish them by the body structure, skin colour, cultural traits manifested in the manner of behaviour, language and gestures. And although I am still far from discovering essential characteristics of individuals, I can find their common traits and fix the specificities of their ways of life. Thus, ideas of the empirical reality of an individual, which is given to us in acts of observation and reflection, are formed.

About the seemingness level of human being. Seemingness characterizes human conditional reality, «being-as-if» [1] and is expressed directly in his person – a special way of individual presentation in the world of other people, in which only certain facets of his personality are demonstrated to the environment, while his self is disguised under various masks

For instance, ancient philosophers (Parmenides and others), regarding many sensual things as seemingness and considering feelings to be deceptive, proposed to go beyond the limits of the surrounding reality of man and attain knowledge about his *true essence*. For this, they believed, one should perform such acts as self-penetration, insight, travel in the infinite cosmos.

Seemingness is the second level of semblance, which characterizes a phenomenon given to a subject of knowledge either directly (through contemplation and observation) or through his perception of its deceptive appearance. «To indicators of seemingness, – emphasizes N.V.Gatinskaya, – such model words (MW) refer as “as if, as it were, as though, allegedly, like, indeed, it seems”, etc.» [2].

Therefore, human seemingness is *distortion of his essence (both real and imagined) performed most often at the behavioural level*. It might manifest in two ways: on the one hand, in the form of a game, where everyone can seem such as his character performs (prototype), on the other hand, in communication, where we very often prefer to hide ourselves beyond the images we assume, for example, «be eccentric», «be a character» or «be as everybody» and «follow the rules of a play».

At the level of discovering seemingness one can use another principle of philosophical investigation: *the human image fixes most often not what he really is (we can only guess about it or make assumptions) but our expectations and ideas of what he is or should be*. Relying on our own experience, we try to separate real behaviour from imaginary one and also from the layers of seemingness and the superpositions of our subjectivity. We also assume that under certain circumstances an individual might seem or be said to be different, remaining himself.

Evidently, an individual himself rarely shows his *true-essential* face in his relationships with other people and with himself, preferring to seem, to demonstrate a certain (comfortable or profitable to him under the circumstances) line of behaviour. And the task of a researcher at this stage is to remove to the extent possible the layers of conditionality (situations of «as-if-being») through reflection and to reveal the real reasons for an individual’s action that are behind his words, intentions, demonstrations, and decorations.

Therefore, seemingness as well as semblance is the external layer of human reality. Taking it off, we are step by step approaching the very essence that still escapes us. But what is it that we are really interested in?

I suppose that a philosopher is not so, as a psychologist, interested in penetration into the «inner world» of another individual, to understand the springs that drive him/her or make to perform certain acts (heroic deeds, defence of honour and dignity, moral choice, etc.). Unlike a psychologist, he strives to personal knowledge and expression of the general, confined to the image of a particular individual and having relation to himself. He is interested not only in the whole world, the whole human universe but also

in particular individuals with their needs and problems, and first and foremost, in himself, manifested through the prism of other people and discovered in all varieties of human types.

As is known, seemingness as a game space is a subject of study in sociology and social psychology. They pay attention to such specificities as a role repertoire or scenario of participants in social interaction, whereas a philosopher regards an act of discovering seemingness as a preliminary stage of reconstruction of the metaphysical image of a human being.

It is noteworthy that at the level of reflexive analysis of semblance only an image of the empirical man that we can observe is being formed, and when discovering seemingness – an image of a «man-mask», who most often passes himself off for the one who at a given moment suits or corresponds to expectations of the surrounding people. But these images are still far from reflecting the true (in our case – metaphysical) essence of a human being. They only make possible to fix his externally observed, behavioural traits. For studying the empirical sphere of human reality such particular-scientific methods are the best suited as observation, content analysis, reflexive analysis and interpretation. However, for comprehension of latent layers of human existence this is not sufficient yet.

Latent layers of human being

As is known, the essence of a human being is hidden from immediate observation. For its discovery, science applies various methods (systemic, functional, phenomenological, etc.). But philosophy cannot be satisfied by generalization of scientific data alone.

The latent layers of human reality as actual, self-accomplishing being are manifested through *whatness* (a human being as a species of being, integrated into the socio-natural whole) and *whoness* (a human being as a questioning being, always in search of his existence and addressing his questions to himself and to the world). They are characterized, respectively, by such essential properties as *itness* (presence or absence in him of certain properties not having the status of existence) and *self* (a human being as a particular unique and special being).

We find such differentiation already in Heidegger who, as is known, divided human being into two kinds: 1) *being-what* or the objectively essential (whatness) and 2) *being-who* or the subjectively essential (whoness) [4].

At the latent level of human knowledge two interrelated principles of research are valid: first, a hu-

man being might be regarded as part of the whole, and hence, as a dependent being (itness); second, from the viewpoint of revealing whoness a human being should be studied as a self-sustained whole that strives for self-realization and self-uniqueness (self).

In our case, itness is indicative simultaneously of the facts of the individual isolated existence of a human being in the world and his various forms of integration into social structures and natural environment, part of which he is.

Not whatness or being-what but whoness as the subjectively essential in a human being is that unique-special, due to which he does not only differs from other people and distances himself from the surrounding world but also experiences himself in freedom. In its turn, the objectively essential («whatness») turns out to be an individual's characteristic in his external, empirical being, which does not depend on subjectivity.

For example, as «what» I belong to the whole world or a particular community (on the social plane). In this sense, I am «it» (a Tatar, an artist, etc.) or «he» (a physical person). While as «who» I belong to myself and am of interest to other people that are spiritually close to me or related through kinship (first of all, my family, friends, colleagues, etc.). In the latter case, I have my «I» that makes me a unique being in the whole world and my experiences and ideas are also unique. Only I and nobody else experience in this way what is going on and think about my own human (and not only) destiny in the world.

Therefore, a human being in his whatness appears as part of the «external» (empirical) world where he displays typical traits, and in the state of whoness he turns out to be left to his own resources and concentrated on the awareness of his presence in the world. To a certain extent, whatness determines a projection of existence of an empirical human being, inscribing his existence into a wider socio-natural context. Whereas in the state of whoness a human being displays his reflexive and existential essence, turning to the world as a peer subject striving for relations of partnership. But all in due course.

The whatness level. Whatness means, in my opinion, *a totality of sustained (and invariable for a long period of time) qualities of a human being united by his generic affinity, by the nature of all humankind.* On the one hand, it is a human being's identity with his genus, that which singles him out from the world of nature and unites with other representatives of this genus. On the other hand, my whatness is what integrates me into a community, makes me part of the social whole irrespective of what and how I think about it. It determines my group affinity and cultural identity.

It is noteworthy that ideas of the whatness of a human being go through a crisis in modern philosophy. A.E.Rybas writes about it, analyzing Heidegger's philosophy: «The question about “what” seems void; in a sense, it is not a question at all, because it aims at what does not exist. No wonder that metaphysics for more than two thousand years has come to nothing, and philosophical thinking that trusted it now is in a hopeless crisis. Opposition to this crisis is possible only through renouncement of the dualistic picture of the world and the practice of representing true reality. For this, the basic question of philosophy should be reformulated [3]. Unlike the author, I do not think so. I am closer to the position of Heidegger who insisted on the separatedness of the human being.

As a matter of fact, behind man's «whatness» there are such abstractions as the «generic man», «political man», «economic man», «modern man», «postmodern man», etc., and many scientific works deal with their substantiation, including my respectable colleagues. But as a representative of the existential-phenomenological trend in philosophy I am interested not in generic or social definitions of human being and even not in the universal in it, but in that which falls outside the framework of the most strict analysis. And this is the extraposition and splitness of his being, remoteness and separatedness from the main sources of natural necessity, social power and influence. It is the territory of man himself, where he, being only an annoying problem for the mighty, tries to break through the chains of «what-being» (the objectively essential), including institutional limitations imposed by society and culture, into the world of «who-being» (the subjectively essential) and other-being.

At this stage of reconstructive analysis I distinguish between two images of human whatness, hiding his metaphysical dimension from us: «man-something» and «man-nothing». The first is associated with the partial presence in a human being of his self, the second – with its complete absence or elimination and ousting.

Something is a special quality of a thing that has separatedness, isolatedness, and, certainly, whatness. In other words, it is a way of isolated and autonomous existence of a human being, which is not reflected in his consciousness, but exists independently of him as an actual given. Being something, I cannot assess it, though other people make it a subject of discussion. But I know that my something reflects in some was the projection of my self onto what-being, though it exists most often despite or irrespective of my idea of it. It is present simultaneously in myself and outside myself

and I can only suppose its existence, observing reactions of other people, since it does not fully belong to me, remaining whatness to a significant degree, though being that which makes me not quite like others and recognizable in the crowd. But this is not recognisability of a particular person, but a strange individual, a wanderer and hermit, though excommunicated or withdrawn from the world but still being in the state of whatness, trying to remain unnoticed. When we speak about an individual that he is «something», we imply not something special or unique in him but that which does not yield to common reflection and might be regarded as a borderline state.

Nothing is a point of uncertainty that is beyond the limits of a space I am aware of [5]. It is characterized by non-transparency, non-evidence and non-embodiment. It has no definite addressee or point of destination. I understand nothing not as absence of being in general but only as non-actualization of existence. Nothing has no other name but other-being, inaccessible to our cognition (for example, anti-world). It is being that has no existence (absence of the presence of anything that makes it real or special). In other words, this is being that is beyond possible existence. Though it has, apparently, its foundations of non-existence and non-presence but we know practically nothing about it. In this connection, an interpretation of a well-known saying ascribed to K.Marx under a new angle is interesting: «Nothing human is alien to me».

Probably, nothing means the nonhuman in a human being or the non-existing in general. But nothingness is not identical to nonbeing at all. It is rather another kind of being (as, for instance, staying in emptiness), about which we know almost nothing.

Therefore, the image of «man-nothing» forms an idea of him as an impersonal and anonymous being, surrendering to external necessity and social expediency, fully dissolved in social or natural chaos. He already does not have anything specifically human but the superhuman has not penetrated into him yet. We find «man-nothing» when we turn to the separatedness of his external and objective being by some not quite evident tokens. This is not anything special, as one might suppose at first sight, but something hardly perceptible and knowledgeable. We can judge about our nothingness only by indirect and quite abstract tokens. It does not yield to reflection, since it is a property of another world that does not belong to us.

The phenomena of the «nothing» and «something» of a human being are manifest in social life as projections of the attitude to him by subjects, for whom other people are objects of their desires. For example, for political figures participating in elections, I, as a

particular elector, am something until I have voted, and as soon as I have made my choice, they might treat me as nothing, devoid of speech and not capable of controlling their further activities in the governmental bodies. But in both cases I am of interest to them exclusively as an object, and elections themselves as an instrument of manipulation with voices of anonymous electorate.

The whoness (self) level. Whoness is expressed literally in the terms «subjectness», «life», «soul», etc. This is not the what yet (i.e. what I am among other objects or anonymous beings), but the who that speaks on the part of himself and manifests himself externally as a particular subject endowed with the freedom of choice.

This difference is of the fundamental character, though I would not liken human whoness to his whatness, as Rorty and some other Western philosophers do. Rorty holds that the question about “who” is not metaphysical but *political* rather, answering the question “Who am I?”, we reckon ourselves among a certain community, for which whoness appears not as a metaphysical definition of being but as a practical rule for communal life due to observation of which the given community is formed. Therefore, it would be more correct to ask “Who are we?”. Exactly in this form, Rorty believes, this question is the fundamental question of philosophy... The question “Who are we?” always presupposes and proceeds from the possible answer «Nobody» and further – «Nothing», which are indicative of the givenness of whoness (subjectivity) and draw attention to the fact that the question about «who» is a question about a value. Rorty calls this question *political*, meaning the *ability to gather around himself a community of like-minded individuals*, for whom affirmation of this value is equal to the sense of their existence» [3].

I believe that the essence of human whoness should not be transferred to the political plane, substituting the question «Who am I?» by the question «Who am I with?». Whoness is *man's questioning the world and addressing himself, his self*. On the other hand, it represents human ability to carry on a dialogue with himself and others not as with continuations or copies of himself but as with other beings. But the main thing in understanding whoness is to discover the mechanism of self-actualization of a human being, his finding of his self and discovery of his personal potential.

Whoness to a greater extent than whatness is analyzable by qualitative methods (for example, life histories, analysis of biographies, ethnographic methods and others), though we most often come to know about the «who» of an individual not by direct (biographical data) but by indirect tokens.

Human whoness is individual measurement of his reality or a subjective layer of personal reality. The main concept here is not the «personality» (as a social self) or the «person» (as an external shell for presentation to others) but the self (as a self-questioning and self-actualized being). Only a self, not a human being as a representative of a genus, class or ethnos, can have questions to itself and to others. Its being is reflexive and self-reflexive by essence. That is why a human being who looses at least as little as some part of his self (self-awareness) ceases to be a subject and falls an easy victim to social and political manipulations.

Human whoness has companions. Therefore its picture should be supplemented by two presentations or modifications that only indirectly point to the outer contour of existence of his self: «someone» and «nobody» [6].

Someone is a human figure that under certain circumstances prefers to remain in the background or hide under a disguise of an unknown person, a stranger. This is an unconscious desire of a human being in a problematic situation to disguise his self behind another's symbolic appearance. In some cases, it might also mean a voluntary or induced departure from the state of visibility (observability) into the latent layers of reality hidden from direct observation. For a particular individual «to be someone» does not mean to part with his self. However, a human being, having a presentiment of danger or negative changes that are to take place in his life, can hide himself behind an invisible cover. This is done first of all in order to protect oneself from a malevolent glance of another individual or negative influence of close environment.

On the contrary, *nobody* is a state of a human being, who for some reason or another does not have his individuality. Possibly, he ceased to be aware of his self. Nobody is a result of depersonalization. While «nothing» is a human being who falls outside the hierarchically organized social system and dissolves himself in its marginal layers, «nobody» is characterized by full or partial absence of self-awareness in a human being, his extra-subject existence. But he simultaneously preserves the unconscious mechanisms of self-regulation that make up a trans-subjective basis of the self.

Therefore, outside a certain group (community) a human being is «nobody» on the social place, but he might remain «someone», to appear as an unknown person with quite uncertain intentions, which does not permit the surrounding people to come to an open confrontation with him or to impose their own game. In this case, «someone» is indicative of the existence of whoness, though in a transformed way. In a social world, if you

do not take a certain place in the social hierarchy, you are «nothing» according to the yardstick of a reference group, while in personal reality you can preserve your self, being «someone» and even partially «nobody».

But is it possible to come out of the state of «nobody» and to acquire one's self, to become somebody? As a well-known hymn reads «We are nobody, let us be all». And what does «all» mean – a master of one's life or a lord of other lives? Can a human being, born a slave and freed at one fine moment from the chains of slavery, acquire a feeling of freedom and become a subject of one's own activities or he nevertheless remains a slave deep within? Many episodes from «Heart of a Dog» are indicative exactly of the latter. He who was born a dog shall not become a human being. The Shvonders, whose time has come or has never been gone, who do nothing but demonstrate activities that hide idleness, bureaucratic boorishness and absence of interest to life, as though, absence of their own spiritual world, will never rise to the state of whoness. It is not given to them.

In a personal reality of every human being one can observe such a typical case: when we meet a stranger who is in the sphere of our attention we first try to overcome the image of «someone» and only later, some time afterwards (sometimes, years after) we come to know more about his person (the external shell of a self), by means of which his «who» is presented. However, the majority of passers-by in the street remain for us «nobody». And only some individuals that intrigue us by their extravagant appearance or uncommon behaviour, behind which, possibly, the true-essential is hidden, might get to the circle of people whom we define as «somebody».

Whereas in real political life, for example, during an election campaign into a country's parliament, the «someone» and «nobody» of a striving to power little-known politician appear as equipositioned and often adjoint. The whoness of such a politician is determined by his publicity, reputation in wide political circles. Until he appears a real election contender, preserving chances to win, he is «someone» for the public. But as soon as he looses to a more popular and more venerable politician, his position can be assessed in the terms of «nobody». But becoming a «nobody» a human being does not loose the whole of his self, but only a part of his image and the possibility of its presentation.

Another criterion of distinguishing between whatness (being-what or the objectively essential) and whoness (being-who or the subjectively essential) is the way of human self-determination. While whatness includes him into a system (community, family, etc.) according to the laws of social integration, i.e. irrespec-

tive of his wish, whoness always gives him a freedom of choice: he can be a definite «who», openly presenting his self, or hide behind the mask of «someone».

Therefore, «man-what» is integrated into a system as an element of the whole, who lacks autonomy, and in case of «nothing» – is fully dissolved in it, becomes completely unnoticeable. «Man-who», in his turn, has the possibility of choice at his disposal. He has a self and personal specificity (autonomy), and his multiple states (various «who», «someone», «nobody») are positioned freely on the scale of personal reality, continuously transforming one into another and forming combinations of the self that project outwards in the shape of various persons and figures. But this is not yet a real (true-essential) human being, who is in harmonic unity with the world, but only one of the dimensions of his latent reality. Now we have approached close to the final stage of reconstructing the metaphysical way of human being.

The metaphysical level of human being (the world of transcendence)

As soon as I could penetrate through the dense layers of the latent reality of human being and discover there, at the level of whoness, the traces of the presence of the human in a human being, the question arises immediately: what is next? And next there begins the space of the self, which appears on the surface of consciousness in various symbolic shells. But the self is the final position on the way of discovering the human in a human being. And where, then, man's true essence is hidden – in his self or in something else? I can only hypothesize that the true-essential in a human being is the superhuman, i.e. not belonging to his self.

In this dimension, a human being manifests himself, on the one hand, as a carrier of the «supreme element» – transcendent, existing beyond the limits of his individual consciousness and sphere of existence (presenting oneself, one's self to the world), on the other hand, as a subject of transcendence (as a predicted, set from above way of transforming the world and oneself in the world). In the final act, he realizes his metaphysical needs. And this is, in my opinion, the main subject matter of philosophical anthropology and one of the fundamental questions of philosophy in general: where is the border between the world of human external, empirical existence («what-being»), his self-being or «who-being» (existence) and other-being (transcendence)?

The main properties of the metaphysicity of human being are, in my opinion, his *authenticity*, used here in the meaning of «trueness» [7], and *otherness*

[8]. They are manifest not only in communication but also in the individual life of a human being. Man has authenticity (as the idea of the trueness of his being) and otherness as a possibility of other-being or super-being, including the ability to be different (other). For distinguishing between «I – other» some authors prefer to use the notion «differentness», denoting most often a human self regarded in its relatedness with the Other (M. Scheler). But differentness might be interpreted as presence and coexistence of various «I» in a human being who apprehends his self through reflection or in some other way. But differentness does not exceed the framework of the state of whoness. Under certain circumstances, I can be different or interact with other people, nevertheless preserving my self.

The metaphysical plane of being characterizes the ultimate and metasubjective level of human existence. In its comprehension, I will be guided by two opposite principles: «a human being should be regarded as a full or maximally possible identity with his self, the point of formation of which is not the universal in it but an idea of the true destination of life» that is produced by a particular individual with involvement of all spiritual experience of mankind (authenticity); «a human being in his metaphysical essence is not equal to himself; he is something more than a sum of his relations with the world, and therefore, in order to see one's own life predestination and to understand other people in their own being he needs to overcome his self and to rise above the reality of his individual existence into the world of other experience inaccessible to contemplation» (otherness)».

Authenticity. Authenticity is the original, genuine and the true-essential in a human being and that which corresponds to his ideas of life predestination. To be authentic means not only to «be oneself» but, following one's intentions and spiritual impulses, to realize one's destination in the world. But to what extent is the authentic conjugated with the set-from-outside transcendent, if it means, in fact, human self-actualization?

I believe that the transcendent as a sphere of the superbeing underlies the very identity «man – world» (in V.S.Barulin's words – «manworld»). Moreover, it acts as a fastening core of this mutually complementary unity.

On the other hand, authenticity means openness to the world and free formation that overcomes seemingness, a spontaneous breakthrough one's own limits, fullness of responsibility for one's actions and something else, which we do not know (in our case – transcendental). But if transcendence (transcending) means going beyond the limits of the human in a hu-

man being, overcoming his empirical essence («being-in-the-world») discovered at the levels of semblance («here-being») or seemingness («being-as-if»), how it correlates with the whatness and whoness of a human being? The answer can be very approximate: maybe they correlate with each other as the «centre » and the «periphery ». The centre and the organizing element in this case is not the self («being-in-oneself-and-for-oneself») but authenticity («being-for-other» or the true-essential). And this other might be both a particular individual (or a group of people) and the world of ideas, at the service of which the whole human life is. Therefore, true identity of a human being with himself is possible only through identity with the world, a part of which he believes himself to be.

One more question. Is the self the ultimate instance in evaluating human authenticity? Certainly not. We cannot evaluate a higher level of organization of an individual life world from a lower level. Authenticity might be self-reference and reference. It correlates with otherness as the other side of the metaphysical state of human being. The essential difference between them is as follows: it is determined by correlation of the directions (vectors) of movement– intentionality (integral attitude to the world, presupposing «movement into the depths») and existentiality (differentiated and selective attitude to the world realized by «movement in breadth»). Authenticity is realized in an intentional way (determination of man's life path in the terms «service», «devotion », «supreme predestination», etc.), while otherness – in an extentional way (generalized characteristic of a particular set or sets of situations of choice and construction of various life programmes).

From this viewpoint, nobody, except a human being himself, knows how he should live. All recommendations about how to live properly or righteously do not have direct relation to the true essence of a human being which is unique and inimitable in the world. And still, in spite of the freedom of choosing variants of his life path a human being forms scenarios of self-actualization taking into account the spiritual experience of humankind and, possibly, with involvement of such forces that remain unknown to him yet.

Otherness. But there is also another metaphysical dimension of human being, in which the true-essential and the super-essential in him are manifested. The superhuman indicates not only the supreme predestination of a human being, which is only mediated but is not fully determined by factors of social and cultural nature. It is his otherness, other-being, open to changes and influences from outside or from above, being of an

individual who is already unable to become «what » («something») but is trying to overcome the limits of his «who». It is communion with the universe which results in multiplication of human essences, broadening of his life space.

As is known, Levinas sees the foundation of his philosophy in presentation of the subjective experience of a human being, whose uniqueness is specified by *transcendence* (the other). Transcendence in this sense is a subject's ascent to the Absolute and not only acknowledgement of the possibility to break through the limits of being [9].

I believe that we can rightfully single out, following Levinas, such kind of being as super-being and other-being, consisting in manifestation of human otherness, multiplicity of his essences and abilities not only to be other and to understand the other but also to ascent to the Absolute (to transcend). A human being is capable to open up new life spaces, filling them with a trans-subjective meaning. And a distinctive feature of such state of human being is a selective attitude to the world and a differentiated unity, demonstrating human potential in all its fullness.

The otherness of a human being, as distinct from whatness, is not engendered by external factors. It is not a result of man's unification with multiple worlds (cosmos, nature, religion, art, ecology, economy, profession, ethnicity, etc.), which determines, in the final analysis, his identity (identification strategies and tactics) but a way of transpersonal existence. In other words, in case of «whatness» we most often have a socially conditioned variety of human types (religious man, ethnical man, economic man, etc.). And in the state of otherness we have to do with his transpersonality, going outside the limits of his self, overcoming social and natural borders. Human creativity is limitless. It is anonymous and infinite.

Therefore, the metaphysical level of human being displays itself in the sphere of the transcendent, related to going outside the limits of not only the visible (and seeming) world and to overcoming the limits of whatness (objective reality) and whoness (subjective reality) but also to the ascent to the supreme, though differentiated, unity (transhumanity as the dissociated Other, superhumanity as the generalized «I» that synthesizes in it many «I»).

Notes:

1. In literature, seemingness is usually interpreted as a unilateral manifestation of the essence of a thing perceived by people directly (for instance, behaviour of other people who want to hide their true intentions or the Sun's visible motion around the

Earth). Seemingness is a notion that expresses a moment of deception in the perception of an object or a phenomenon. It is being that shows itself not as it really is. The opposite is a phenomenon (K.Frumkin, 1989). Or seemingness is a distorted semblance, a superficial view of things, a unilateral or distorted manifestation of the essence outwards (D.V.Pivovarov, 1989).

2. See: *Gatinskaya N.V.* O funktsionalno-semanticheskom opisani modalnykh slov – znakov kazhimosti [On a functional-semantic description of modal words – signs of seemingness] // *Russkiy yazyk za rubezhom* [Russian language abroad]. 2001. No. 1.
3. See: *Rybas A.E.* Osnovnoy vopros filosofii budushchego Rorty [The main question of Rorty's philosophy of future] (see: http://anthropology.ru/ru/texts/rybas/russia_15.html).
4. In Heidegger's interpretation, being is a totality of what things are in the broadest sense... A human being also refers to being but as a special being, as well as all forms of society and its institutions he created... It is exactly the faculty of understanding and self-understanding that serves as a basis for dividing being into two kinds: 1) being-what (whatness) and 2) being-who (whoness). It is the being of this being as "whoness" that is denoted by the word "existence". A human being, believes Heidegger, is the being that exists by way of existence... Only a human being exists... Heidegger replaces the notion of a human being by the German word *Dasein*, which is translated as "here-being", "there-being", "presence"... So, the word "*Dasein*", in principle, is not identical with the notion of a "human being" but expresses the human being in a specific sense. (See: <http://felr.ru/xajdegger/>).
5. As is known, the term «nobody» literally means in philosophical literature the absence, the non-

being of a particular being or the absence of being in general.

6. The word «somebody» is used instead of the name of an unknown, intentionally uncalled or non-concretized but presupposed in a given situation person.
7. Literally, authentic is what corresponds to the original. As is known, the notion «authenticity» (from Greek *authentikos* – original) in modern personology was proposed and substantiated by C.Rodgers. In his opinion, it characterizes a human ability to renounce typical forms of expression in communication (various social roles), allowing manifestation of original, specific only to him thoughts, emotions and manners of behaviour.
8. *Otherness* is the opposite or opposed element in a binary opposition: «I»/other (ego/other), East/West, male/female. As is known, man's addressing to man, unlike a call in the animal world, rests upon, according to Buber, the establishment and acknowledgment of the otherness of another human being.
9. According to S.L. Vorob'eva, «Levinas distinguishes between three different points of view on transcendence: 1) negation of the possibility of an escape ("trans") from the visible world; 2) acknowledgment of the possibility of both an escape from the limits of being ("first trans"), and also the ascent to the Absolute ("second trans"); 3) the intermediate – transcendental point of view recognizing the first trans and negating the second (Husserl's "phenomenological reduction"). Heidegger's point of view lies in the interval between the second and third Husserl's points of view. Levinas accepts the second point of view, recognizing transcendence, radical separatedness, "differentness" as the essence of being» (see: <http://slovari.yandex.ru/dict/postmodernism/article/pm1/pm1-0341>).

References:

1. *Gatinskaya N.V.* O funktsionalno-semanticheskom opisani modalnykh slov – znakov kazhimosti [On a functional-semantic description of modal words – signs of seemingness] // *Russkiy yazyk za rubezhom* [Russian language abroad]. 2001. No. 1.
2. *Rybas A.E.* Osnovnoy vopros filosofii budushchego Rorty [The main question of Rorty's philosophy of future] (see: http://anthropology.ru/ru/texts/rybas/russia_15.html).